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Russia and the EU are the strongest actors on the European continent of the 21st century. Will the strategic partnership 
between the EU and Russia unite the entire continent under a “common European home” or will the continent be split 
in two? Russia joining the rest of Europe is set to proceed initially through the Energy Alliance.  
 
Strategic Neighbourhood: EU-Europe versus EU-East 
 
In the 15 years since the fall of the Berlin wall, 
the European continent has changed funda-
mentally. Western and Central Eastern Europe 
now form a unified EU-Europe, which seeks to 
expand its values and influence onto its direct 
neighbours in Eastern Europe, Eurasia, the 
Maghreb, as well as the Near and Middle East. 
Russia, the Ukraine and other former Soviet 
republics form what the EU sees as “Wider 
Europe”.  
 
Whether the relationship between the EU and 
“Wider Europe” will continue to develop con-
structively, or will turn confrontational, is still 
unforeseeable.  
 
A lack of interest on behalf of the EU with 
regards to the eastern regions of Europe, 
where the processes of transformation are 
considerably slower than in Central Europe, as 
well as the growing disillusionment of Rus-
sians and Ukrainians with the EU, have 
slowed down the unification process. 
 
The following article is based on comments of 
participants of the trilateral German-French-
Russian conference, which took place at the 
DGAP at the end of June 2004 with the support 
of the Planning Staffs of the respective coun-
tries’ foreign ministries. In addition, the con-
tent of the discussion by prominent Russian 
and Western politicians presented at the tradi-
tional DGAP EU-Russia Forum earlier this 
year in Berlin will also be related. Questions of 
how the Ukraine, which is disappointed with 
the West, can be integrated into the vicinity 
strategy of the EU, are set to be discussed at 
the forthcoming Bergedorf Forum of the Kör-
ber Foundation in Lwiw (Ukraine). 
 
The Four Common Spaces Strategy 
 
The EU faces the problem of how to position 
itself towards an economically strengthened, 
but authoritarian new Russia under Vladimir 
Putin. There are different perspectives in the 
West.  
 
After the integration of the formerly commu-
nist Central European states into the EU, it 
might have become more difficult to establish 
a common strategy towards Russia. Especially 
in these countries there exists strong anti-
Russian resentment.  
 
In Europe there are quite a few voices that 
propose a politics of isolation against the un-
democratic and for Europe in many ways alien 
Russia. Others – among them the German 
Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, the French 
President Jacques Chirac and the Italian pre-
mier, Silvio Berlusconi – in contrast advocate a 
concrete strategic partnership with Russia, 
which could stabilize the east of the European 
continent in the long-term, strengthen their 
country’s own energy security, and potentially 
increase Europe’s prosperity through a con-
nection to the lucrative Russian market.  
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In order to address Moscow’s desire to partici-
pate in the building of the future Europe, 
without simultaneously opening up a path for 
Russia to full membership in EU and NATO, 
the EU and Russia have established a model of 
“Four Common Spaces” comprising economy, 
foreign/security policy, domestic security, 
culture/information/education. Theoretically, 
the path towards a strategic neighbourhood 
leading to the formation of a “Common Euro-
pean House” could run along this construc-
tion. The countries “in between”, such like 
Ukraine, could be tied into this initiative, as 
long as they wish to be. 
 
At the core of the “Common Economic Area” 
is the energy alliance. According to uniform 
expert opinion, the global demand of oil and 
gas will increase. Russia, as stated recently at 
an energy conference in Washington, is fore-
casted to become the world’s largest supplier 
of energy, along with Saudi Arabia, by 2015 
and will consequently be in a position to de-
termine world market prices. Then the EU 
might have to compete with Asia and the USA 
for partnership with Russia. In EU-circles it is 
becoming increasingly evident that Russia 
could soon position itself as an indispensable 
partner in questions of energy security. Rus-
sia’s current continuing dependence on the 
West (foreign debt) would be reversed. 
 
According to present estimates, the Russian 
supplies would not suffice to provide both 
Europe and Asia with the necessary quantities 
of oil and gas, unless there was a dramatic 
increase in production. For this reason, the 
question of who will furnish the necessary 
technology and capital transfer to Russia for 
the modernizing of its energy sector will be of 
particular strategic importance. These compa-
nies will have a better hand to deal in the fu-
ture. The required investment for the next ten 
years is estimated at 85 billion US-Dollars. 
Russia cannot come up with it on its own. 
 
As the industrial revolution unrolled in Russia 
130 years ago, European industrial groups and 
banks streamed east, without shying away 
from risk, established oil companies in Baku 
and began to connect Russia to the West eco-
nomically. Despite the fact that the industrial-
ists suffered substantial losses, due to the 
events following the October Revolution and 
the consequent nationalization of the entire 
economy, they returned to Russia at the next 
opportunity. Today, they are vehemently 
knocking at the door of the Russian market 
which still remains not fully open. 
 
Russia says it needs the EU primarily as a 
partner for its modernization. Putin is enticing 
the Europeans with the promising energy alli-
ance, and is dexterously betting on the Euro-
pean economy for the main support of his 
foreign policy. The economic circles applaud 
Putin’s course of domestic modernization. His 
determined battle against regional separatism, 
corruption, the reduction of Russia’s foreign 
debt, the new tax code, the establishment of 
more transparent privatization methods, the 
dismantling of state subsidies, and finally the 
begin of banking reforms are concrete policy 
triumphs, that one waited in vain for under 
Boris Yeltsin.  
 
Putin wishes to build the Russian economy 
along four main pillars: energy, defence, 
transportation and banking. The key enter-
prises in these four areas are to be kept under 
the control of the state. The personnel deci-
sions and the structural changes in these four 
economic branches leave no doubts open as to 
this question. Putin has declared the energy 
sector, which is responsible for 40 percent of 
the government tax revenue, 55 percent of the 
export profits and 20 percent of the entire Rus-
sian economy, the most important component 
of national state interests. The state will not 
allow this sector, on which Russia is depend-
ent in order to reclaim its Great Power status 
to be controlled by the private interests of 
profit addicted oligarchs, or foreign trans-
national corporations.  
 
Is it possible, under these conditions, in which 
it is obvious that unwritten rules exist, for 
foreign firms to be successful in the Russian 
energy market? Putin has just recently made 
new offers to German, French and British in-
vestors. Foreign companies are needed as 
partners in the energy sector; however, they 
cannot themselves be full-fledges owners of 
Russian energy companies.  
 
Germany is the key country for Putin’s realiza-
tion of his conception of the energy alliance. 
With the aid of German firms and the German 
Chancellor’s political support, a German-
Russian-Ukrainian Gas consortium is to be 
developed. New massive pipelines across the 
Baltic See are to increase gas exports from Rus-
sia to Germany into the EU.  
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What are the perspectives concerning military 
collaboration and cooperation with regards to 
questions of foreign and security policy, i.e. 
the second “Common Area”? During the Iraq 
crisis in early 2003, Russia together with Ger-
many and France formed an opposition to the 
American-British Iraq war. Thereby Russia 
distinguished itself as a subject of European 
policy in the formation of the future world 
order. Russia swung to the foreign policy line 
of the EU, the so-called quartet for the resolu-
tion of Middle East problems. While Germany 
and France at present secure peace in Afghani-
stan with the Eurocorps, there are indications 
that Russia could send a military contingency 
for peacekeeping to Iraq. Russia, France and 
Germany hold regular summits to draw a 
common foreign political line in global affairs. 
They also adjust their common approach to-
wards the United States.  
 
Russia has made its territory available for 
NATO transports to Afghanistan. Future co-
operation within the framework of NATO as 
well as with the European Security and De-
fence institutions appears logical. For the first 
time in 100 years there are no obvious contra-
dictions between Europe and Russia with re-
gards to the architecture of the future world 
order.   
  
Close cooperation can be witnessed in the 
“common area of interior security”. The Krem-
lin has instated one of its most influential poli-
ticians, FSB-General Viktor Ivanov for this 
purpose.  If significant progress is made in this 
field, it is quite possible that Putin’s wish to 
abolish the visa regime between the EU and 
Russia could be realized. Differing opinions 
exist in the EU and Russia pertaining to the 
question of Russian minorities in the Baltic 
countries and the war in Chechnya.  
 
Russia demands from the EU a strict adher-
ence to the minority protection regulations 
with regard to ethnic Russians; Sergei 
Yastrzhembsky, Putin’s Special-Envoy for EU 
Affairs, complained at a seminar of experts at 
the Körber-Foundation in the beginning of July 
in Berlin, that Russians in Lithuania and Esto-
nia are still considered second-class citizens, in 
contradiction to EU-norms. On the European 
side, Russia is still being blamed for severe 
human rights abuses in Chechnya and for its 
wrongdoings in working with the population 
in the separatist republic.  
 
Constructive relations between the EU and 
Russia have soured in the recent past. In the 
post-Soviet area serious conflicts threaten to 
arise between Russia on the one side, and be-
tween the EU and the US on the other. Mos-
cow is observing the EU’s neighbourhood 
strategy towards countries like the Ukraine, 
Belarus, Moldova and Georgia, which the EU 
has newly labelled it’s “Near Abroad”, with 
increasing suspicion. Up to now, these coun-
tries were perceived by Moscow to be its own 
exclusive “Near Abroad”. 
 
It is evident that Russia and the EU are not 
willing to consider the western CIS-states as a 
“Common Neighbouring Area”. Possible EU 
peacekeeping operations in Moldova (Trans-
nistria) and the Caucasus (Abkhazia, South-
Ossetia, Karabakh) are denounced in Moscow. 
The EU criticizes that Russian peacekeeping 
missions in the post-Soviet area have the ex-
clusive purpose of maintaining Russian influ-
ence. Both sides demand control for future 
planning of such peace missions.   
 
The future and consequences of the historical 
processes of the EU and NATO’s eastern ex-
pansion are evidently difficult to predict. 
Whether a new era of a united Greater Europe 
commenced on the 1st of May of 2004, or 
whether the expansion of the West into the 
east of Europe will provoke a new fracturing 
of the European continent remains unknown. 
Will the Russian elite, if it puts its traditional 
superpower dreams aside, search for a reunifi-
cation with the “historic Europe”, as the Poles 
and other Central Europeans have done? Then 
indeed the fourth “common area of culture, 
education and information” could receive a 
strong foundation.  
 
Or will the Russians instead seek to establish 
an anti-western alliance in the post-soviet terri-
tory which would provoke the EU to push 
Russia into Asia? 
 
Flirting with the idea of an EU-East 
 
Russia would like above all to receive the right 
to have a say in the designing of the future 
architecture of Europe that reflects its size and 
importance. Russia rejects EU’s sole posture on 
the European continent.  At the same time, 
Russia is resisting Western intervention in the 
post-Soviet area, which Moscow continues to 
see as an area of its own national interest.  
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Russia would like to establish a common eco-
nomic zone with the EU, leading to the amal-
gamation of the Siberian area, rich in raw ma-
terials, with the technologically advanced po-
tential of Europe (Putin speech in the 
Bundestag 2001). By no means is Russia how-
ever willing to give up any aspects of its state 
sovereignty to Brussels; the reestablishment of 
Russia’s Great Power position remains the top 
priority of Russian politics.  
 
Russia, to this day, categorically rejects any 
Western criticism of its non-liberal value-
system. A consensus has been established in 
the Russian elite and society that liberalism 
and democracy have to take a secondary posi-
tion, until Russia has strengthened itself do-
mestically and towards the outside world 
(Richard Pipes).  
 
For Putin there is no reason to deny this “so-
cietal contract”. Russia offers the EU a com-
munity based on interest, instead of values, 
economic pragmatism instead of civil dia-
logue, a modernization partnership instead of 
a democratic partnership.  
 
This illustrates the different expectations that 
Russia and the EU possess for the future 
Europe. For Western Europeans, Europe 
represents above all a “system of universal 
values”. For Russia, Europe was and remains a 
geographic entity. These differing perspectives 
on Europe are not new; the dispute is at least 
200 years old. In the 19th century the countries 
of Prussia, Austria, Great Britain, France and 
Spain already considered the expansive Rus-
sian Empire at the east of the continent as 
something hostile and threatening. The West-
ern press reported, as it does today, exceed-
ingly critically of Russia.   
 
Russia had then, as it still does today, an am-
bivalent image of the West. On the one hand 
the country wanted to learn from the techno-
logically further advanced Western Europe, to 
emulate Western scientists, and to enjoy the 
Western lifestyle. On the other hand Russians 
saw themselves as spiritually superior (Idea of 
the “Third Rome”) and rejected the “universal 
values” proclaimed by the West, as an unfit-
ting foreign culture, unsuitable for its own 
society (see N. Ya. Danilevsky, “Russia and 
Europe”, Saint Petersburg 1871).  
 
No one should harbour illusions with regards 
to the current understanding of Europe by 
Russians, that there is a generation of cosmo-
politan, western values-embracing new breed 
of Russian leaders on the way. With the big 
money, and the rise of Russian businessmen 
hitting the rankings of the richest men in the 
world, the Russian-isolationist world view is 
gaining further influence. Russian values are 
increasingly perceived as independent and 
incompatible with the traditions of the West-
ern world. Russia’s approach to the West has, 
according to its own view, the sole purpose of 
strengthening its empire. Integration is not 
wanted (Die Welt).  
 
Today’s Russians want to live materially as 
they do in the West, however they do not de-
sire a Western liberal model for their own 
country (Andrei Fedorov). 
 
The Russian side has recently shown itself to 
be irritated, in many aspects with regard to the 
EU-Russia relationship. Moscow has underes-
timated the newly gained political might of an 
expanded Europe, and reacted with total sur-
prise, as the EU began to show a never-before 
seen tough political stance in negotiations with 
Russia. The EU introduced visas for Russian 
travelers in transit to and from Kaliningrad, 
raised export restrictions for Russian goods 
into the new Central Eastern European EU 
member states, and reacted to the proposed 
energy dialogue with its own demands of Rus-
sia: to decentralize its state-run energy mo-
nopolies.  
 
The Russian side reacted with indignation to 
two EU strategy papers in February of 2004, in 
which Russia was sharply criticized for its 
break from democratic principles. 
 
Putin’s uneasiness towards the EU is increas-
ing. In his view, the EU has rejected many of 
his recommendations for cooperation. In his 
widely scrutinized speech to Russian diplo-
mats, he did not mention the EU at all; instead 
he singled out Germany, France and Italy as 
the only European countries that were inter-
ested in a real friendship with his country.  
 
According to Putin, the West is actually inter-
ested in preventing a strong Russia, and would 
therefore organize campaigns with the aim of 
damaging Russia’s image. The Kremlin chief 
fiercely criticized “foreign forces”, which seek 
to hinder him from reuniting Russia with for-
mer Soviet Republics. The earlier pragmatism, 
which formerly characterized Putin’s foreign 
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policy, seems to have yielded to an emotional 
friend-foe philosophy. 
 
Putin’s second term illustrates a new foreign 
policy direction. The focus of diplomacy lies 
now on the CIS. Apparently Putin believes that 
he can no longer expect any reciprocity from 
the West, other than the green light to join the 
WTO, and the consolidation of Russia’s mem-
bership to the G-8.  He will not receive the go-
ahead for reconstructing the lost influence in 
the former Soviet area that he hoped for. 
 
Russia has ambitious plans, which aim far 
beyond a modernization partnership with the 
EU. Moscow wants to regain its Great Power 
role in world politics as soon as possible, and 
believes it can achieve this, due to its favour-
able starting point on the world energy mar-
ket. Saudi Arabia admittedly has more oil re-
serves than Russia, but is not the world’s sec-
ond biggest nuclear power. In order to become 
a Great Power, Russia, however, needs an 
alliance with the former Soviet republics, 
which have however not made any attempts to 
again become a part of the Russian hemi-
sphere.  
 
Putin may try to use the time out, which the 
EU has given itself with respect to further ex-
pansion plans, in order to create a separate 
“Eastern EU”. 
 
Since Putin was not able to produce a reunifi-
cation with Belarus in his first term in office, 
he is aiming his integration strategy at the 
Ukraine. The Ukraine has always been the 
most important corner stone of his future inte-
gration model. Just months before the end of 
his presidency, Leonid Kuchma was pushed to 
join the “Common Economic Area” comprised 
of Russia, the Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Bela-
rus and to renounce the goal of a membership 
to the EU and NATO.  
 
A strategic pipeline, which initially was going 
to transport Caspian oil to the West, circum-
venting Russia, was swiftly revamped, and 
will now pump Russian oil to the Mediterra-
nean.  The Ukraine, which until then had al-
ways spoken in favor of diversifying Russian 
energy deliveries, aided with these measures 
the cementing of Russia’s transport monopoly.  
 
The Ukraine is disillusioned. It had hoped for 
membership considerations to the EU and 
NATO. Instead, it was sidelined and offered 
the cheap alternative of a vague vicinity strat-
egy. Kuchma’s dramatic swing towards Russia 
can be seen as a form of revenge against the 
EU and NATO for neglecting his country. 
 
Two further building blocks already form the 
foundation of what the Kremlin chief envis-
ages as the integration model for the future: 
the nuclear energy alliance with the two other 
most important oil and gas producing states in 
the territory of the former Soviet Union, Ka-
zakhstan and Turkmenistan. A strategic union 
between these states could in fact amount to a 
gas-OPEC like organization, with which the 
industrial countries in Europe and Asia would 
have to be on good terms with.  
 
From the present-day perspective however, 
Putin’s “Eastern EU” strategy is destined to 
fail. Almost all the CIS states, with the excep-
tion of Belarus, secretly foster the hope to enter 
the EU and NATO in the not too distant fu-
ture. Even Belarus, according to the politically 
moderate and potential presidential aspirant 
Natalia Masherova, who belongs to neither the 
Lukashenko-camp, nor the “radical” liberal 
opposition in Minsk, will not risk its sover-
eignty in exchange for a return to Russia.  
 
The politics of the newly elected Georgian 
Head of State is set upon releasing Georgia as 
expediently as possible from the CIS and an-
choring it firmly into Western structures. Even 
if countries like the Ukraine occasionally turn 
to Russia, because the doors to the West re-
main closed to them now, they will never lose 
sight of Brussels. 
 
The EU and Russia are currently in a process 
of consolidation and identity searching. The 
EU will presumably expand into the Balkans 
and Turkey in the next decade. Russia will 
attempt to integrate the former Soviet Repub-
lics into a “Common Economic Area” and into 
a “Collective Defence Alliance”. 
 
He may try to assemble the former Soviet 
states into an “Eastern EU” to facilitate these 
countries’ and Russia’s perspectives in joining 
the EU together.  But today, in the clash over 
“universal values”, Russia feels increasingly 
pushed out of Europe and towards Asia (Mik-
hail Delyagin).   
 
However, Russia and the EU are already fight-
ing – which is much more dangerous -- over 
spheres of influence on the European conti-
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nent. Problems that appeared to have long 
vanished under the ruins of the Cold War are 
suddenly reaching daylight.  
 
Memories of long-ago are reawakening. Has 
Russia’s turn towards Europe always been a 
means to an end? The erstwhile Chancellor of 
Tsar Peter I,  Osterman, once said: “We need 
Europe for some decades, then however we 
must moon it” (A. W. Just, „Russland in Eu-
ropa“, Stuttgart 1949, p. 221). 
 
Putin has recently contradicted him, postulat-
ing that Russians and Germans could one day 
have a shared capital, Brussels. In fact, for 
Putin, the “Eastern-EU” project could repre-
sent the preliminary stage for joint Russian 
and former Soviet Republic integration with 
EU-Europe. 
 
One of the most gripping questions of the 21st 
century is: can Russia strive for a Great Power 
status, while countries like China, India and 
the EU also compete for this position? This 
question is not digressive for the EU, it will 
have to consider how it is to use Russia’s new 
potential to its advantage. The EU will be 
forced, whether it likes it or not, to double its 
energy purchases from Russia in the coming 
years.  
The increase in potential danger from Islamic 
extremists for the entire Western and Eurasian 
civilization will make a security partnership 
with Russia, as conceptualized after the attacks 
of September 11, 2001, compulsory. 
 
The question of how the relationship between 
a future EU-Europe and an enormous non-EU-
European Russian state should develop must 
become a priority for the foreign- and security-
strategy policy planning of the future Foreign 
Office of the EU.  
 
The question is relatively easy to answer: a 
democratic Great Russia, which uses its newly 
acquired potential for the improvement in the 
standard of living of its huge population, 
represents no danger for the West, but in effect 
a guarantee for stability.  
 
The West is observing anxiously how Putin 
executes his social-communal reform program. 
An undemocratic Great Russia, which invests 
its accumulated wealth into military programs, 
and which swings its mighty club with over-
whelming state power, as presently in the 
“Yukos” case, awakens fear in Europe. 
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